Breaking silence on Gaza abuses
July 15, 2009
A human rights group founded by Israeli veterans has collected what it says are damning testimonies from soldiers who took part in the offensive in January against Hamas fighters in Gaza. BBC correspondent Paul Wood looks at the anonymous claims presented by Breaking the Silence.
Standing by the ruins of his home in Gaza, Majdi Abed Rabbo explained how Israeli troops had used him as a human shield.
“The Israeli soldiers handcuffed me and pointed the gun at my neck,” he said. “They controlled every step.”
In this manner, Mr Abed Rabbo said, he was forced to go in ahead of Israeli soldiers as they cleared houses containing Palestinian gunmen.
This same incident was described by one of the Israeli soldiers who spoke to Breaking the Silence.
Israel’s military is now looking into Majdi Abed Rabbo’s claims
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“A Palestinian neighbour is brought in,” he says. “It was procedure. The soldier places his gun barrel on the civilian’s shoulder.”
If true, that was a clear breach of the international laws of war – which say soldiers have a duty of care to non-combatants – and of Israeli law.
The Israeli Supreme Court outlawed the so-called “neighbour policy”, of using Palestinians to shield advancing troops, in 2005.
Until now, the Israeli army always had a ready answer to allegations that war crimes were committed during its offensive in Gaza.
Such claims were, they said, Palestinian propaganda.
Now, though, the accusations of abuse are being made by Israeli soldiers.
Testimonies collected
The common thread in the almost 30 testimonies collected by Breaking the Silence is that orders were given to prevent Israeli casualties, whatever the cost in Palestinian lives.
Writing the report’s introduction, the Israeli lawyer Michael Sfard says: “All the witnesses agreed that they received a particular order repeatedly, in a way that did not leave much room for doubt, to do everything, everything, so that they – the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) soldiers – would not be harmed.
“The soldiers tell in their testimonies how this unwritten message, which came from brigade, battalion, and company commanders in morale-building conversations before entering Gaza, translated into zero patience for the life of enemy civilians.”
Israel denies its soldiers broke the laws of war
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The lawyer adds: “Violations of the laws of war are liable to be war crimes.”
Here are just a few quotes which give a flavour of the soldiers’ testimony. The accumulation of detail is convincing and, in the eyes of Israel’s critics, damning.
“Things are happening in his battalion of which he (the commander) has no idea. There are people who deserve to go to jail…
“When your company commander and battalion commander tell you, ‘Go on, fire!’ the soldiers will not hold back. They are waiting for this day, the fun of shooting and feeling all that power in your hands…
“Fire power was insane. We went in and the booms were just mad. The minute we got to our starting line, we simply began to fire at suspect places. You see a house, a window, shoot at the window. You don’t see a terrorist there? Fire at the window. In urban warfare, anyone is your enemy. No innocents.”
Israeli military spokeswoman Lt Col Avital Leibovich dismissed the testimonies as anonymous hearsay, designed to embarrass the army rather than lead to serious investigations.
She questioned why Breaking the Silence had not handed over its findings earlier, before the media were informed.
“We are investigating many of the requests from NGOs and other groups,” she said. “But when you have a report that is based on hearsay, with no facts whatsoever, we can’t do anything with it.”
In the past, says the Israeli military, some allegations of wrong-doing in Gaza have turned out to be second or third-hand accounts, the result of soldiers recycling rumours in the battalion rather than describing what they themselves witnessed.
Credible record
But Breaking the Silence has a long – and to many, credible – record of getting soldiers to talk about experiences which might not reflect well on the Army.
The group is funded by the British, Dutch and Spanish governments, as well as the EU.
It says the testimony is anonymous because of orders to Israeli soldiers not to speak out publicly.
Some of the collected testimony is highly specific.
In the case of Majdi Abed Rabbo, the Israeli military police have now opened an investigation, lending at least some credibility to the soldier who said the “neighbour policy” was in widespread use.
The military maintains it went to extraordinary lengths to ensure civilians were not harmed in Gaza.
The soldiers’ testimony does describe in detail how leaflets were distributed in areas they were about to enter – warning people to leave.
But it is what happened after that, says Breaking the Silence, which calls into question the morality of the Israeli army’s actions.
bbc.co.uk
Iran, no way for end
June 25, 2009
BBC News
The opposition will almost certainly try to hold more rallies
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Nearly two weeks after Iran’s bitterly contested presidential election, there are signs that the government is beginning to regain control.
With a heavy security presence on the streets, Wednesday appears to have had the least protests of any day since the result was announced.
But any idea that the opposition is about to go gently into the good night is probably an illusion. There is still a depth of feeling in this argument, on both sides, that suggests the dispute could rage for weeks or even months.
With the security forces and the state media under its control, the Iranian government has some powerful tools.
It has been reluctant to use live fire on the demonstrators, if only because that would just stir more protests, though guns have certainly been used on occasions. Short of that, the government has been pressing hard to close down and discredit the opposition protests.
Opposition’s options
But the opposition has avenues open to it as well. It will almost certainly try to hold more demonstrations.
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IRAN UNREST
12 June Presidential election saw incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected with 63% of vote
Main challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi called for result to be annulled on grounds of electoral fraud
Street protests saw at least 17 people killed and foreign media restricted
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The opposition could try to evade the security presence by simply urging supporters to go out onto the pavements or sidewalks across Iran’s cities and stand in solidarity, something that has already begun to happen spontaneously.
Or it can launch a general strike, a radical step the leadership have so far been reluctant to authorise, or other forms of civil disobedience.
The government would be particularly nervous of a strike amongst oil workers, or amongst the rich merchants, the Bazaaris, whose role in bringing down the Shah is almost legendary.
There are options within the political system as well.
Former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a key figure behind the opposition, chairs the Assembly of Experts, a powerful body of clerics that has the power to monitor the performance or to dismiss the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.
Dismissal would be a political earthquake bigger than anything seen since the 1979 revolution, but even a hint of criticism of the Supreme Leader from an official body would be highly damaging.
In recent days Mr Rafsanjani has reportedly been in the clerical capital, Qom, rallying support, though he has not yet openly shown his hand.
Then there is the parliament, the Majlis. The majority of MPs are conservative, certainly not Mousavi supporters, but also quite hostile to President Ahmadinejad.
They could cause problems when the president presents his new cabinet for approval from July 26 to August 19.
Already the Majlis speaker, Ali Larijani, has voiced criticism of raids on student dormitories by the government militia, the Basij, and a committee of MPs called in the interior minister for questioning.
Western role
In recent days the government has been trying to move the focus, increasing the volume of criticism of the outside world, particularly Britain.
Ayatollah Khamenei had ordered protesters to stop their protests
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The Iranian foreign minister has talked of perhaps lowering the level of representation between Iran and the UK – a hint that the British ambassador might be expelled from Tehran.
Targeting Britain is a tactic that will certainly rally the support amongst the faithful. Even opposition supporters are curious about Britain’s role.
So foreign leaders, particularly US President Barack Obama, have been astute in limiting their comments and their criticism to the treatment of demonstrators, not the conduct of the election or the count.
Mr Obama has already played his role by opening the door to dialogue with Iran.
It is clearly one of the factors behind the current turmoil within the Iranian establishment. Hardliners must wonder whether the system can survive even a partial reconciliation with the US.
But above all this is an argument within Iran about the future of the country.
It is much more complex than pro- versus anti-Westerners, or even Islamists versus secularists.
President Ahmadinejad has his supporters even amongst Iranians who have chosen to live in the West and in the US.
Opposition supporters insist they are good Muslims, and argue that they would defend Iran’s independence as fiercely as anyone.
But the two sides have deeply differing views on how Iran should be run, and its place in the world. And neither is about to give ground.
bbc.co.uk
A Different Iranian Revolution
June 19, 2009
This article was written by a student in Iran who, for reasons of safety, did not want to be identified by his full name.
Tehran
WE look over this wall of marching people to see what our friends in the United States are saying about us. We cannot help it — 30 years of struggle against the Enemy has had the curious effect of making us intrigued. To our great dismay, what we find is that in important sectors of the American press a disturbing counternarrative is emerging: That perhaps this election wasn’t a fraud after all. That the United States shouldn’t rush in with complaints of democracy denied, and that perhaps Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the president the Iranian people truly want (and, by extension, deserve).
Do not believe it. Those so-called experts warning Americans to be leery of claims of fraud by the opposition are basing their arguments on an outdated understanding of Iran that has little to do with the reality of what we here are experiencing during these singular days.
For instance, some American analysts assert that the demonstrations are taking place only in the sections of Tehran — in the north, around the university and Azadi Square — where the educated and well-off reside. Of course, those neighborhoods were home to the well-to-do … 30 years ago. The notion that these areas represent “the nice part of town” will come as a surprise to their residents, who endure the noise, congestion and pollution of living in the center of a megalopolis.
People who haven’t visited a city in decades are bound to give out bad directions. But their descriptions of where the protests are taking place, and why, also draw on pernicious myths of an iron correlation between religion and class, between location and voting tendency, in Iran.
This false geography imagines South Tehran and the countryside as home only to the poor, those natural allies of political Islam, while North Tehran embodies unbridled gharbzadegi (translated as “Weststruckness” or “Westernitis”) and is populated by people addicted to the Internet and vacations in Paris. It is as if political Islam withers north of Vanak Square and the only residents to be found are “liberals” who voted for the opposition leader, Mir Hussein Moussavi.
We must not assume that the engagement of members of society with their religion is uniform or that religious devotion equals automatic loyalty to a particular brand of politics. To do so is certainly to deny Iran’s poor the capacity to think for themselves, to deny that the politics of the past four years may have made their lives worse — and plays right into Mr. Ahmadinejad’s dubious claim to be the most authentic representative of the 1979 revolution. Mr. Moussavi was, let’s not forget, a favored son of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and a member of Iran’s original cohort of revolutionaries, and he remains a firm believer in the revolution and the framework of the Islamic Republic.
But the United States seems able to view our country only through anxieties left over from the 1979 revolution. In the “how did we lose Iran?” assessments after the overthrow of the shah, many American intelligence agents and policy makers decided that their great mistake was to spend too much time canoodling with the royal family and intellectual elites of the capital. Commentators now are worried that, by siding with the opposition today, the United States will once again fall into the trap of backing the losing side.
But the fact is, Tehran is not the Iranian anomaly it was 30 years ago. It has become more like the rest of the country. Internal migration, not just to Tehran but to other major cities, has accelerated, driven in part by the growth of universities in places like Isfahan, Tabriz, Mashad and Shiraz, and now nearly 70 percent of Iranians live in cities. The much vaunted rural vote represents not a decisive bloc for Mr. Ahmadinejad but a minimum, one that was easily swamped by the increased turnout of city dwellers, who normally sit elections out.
And, of course, Iran in 2009 — better yet, Iran on June 12, 2009 — is not the same as Iran in 1979. Just as Tehran’s neighborhoods cannot be fixed in time, the cultural lives of Iranians have greatly changed in the past 30 years. The postrevolutionary period has seen the expansion of education, the entry of women into the work force in large numbers, and changing patterns of marriage and even of divorce. These have all shaped Iranian society. The pseudo-sociology peddled by so many in the West would easily dissolve with a week’s visit.
nytimes
shaking Tehran
June 15, 2009
former BBC Tehran correspondent
On the face of it, the disturbances currently shaking Tehran in the wake of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial re-election look very similar to the street clashes that erupted there in July 1999 and June 2003.
As happened then, thousands of angry and disillusioned people, their hopes for change frustrated, have taken to the streets, clashing with security forces and hardline vigilantes who roam the city on motorcycles.
Buses and banks have been burnt, and student dormitories raided by police or irregulars, as happened on those earlier occasions.
The 1999 and 2003 disturbances involved thousands of protesters, rather than the millions it would take to shake the Islamic regime seriously.
They petered out after about 10 days, and achieved nothing, in the face of stern repression.
Will that be the fate of the current protests, too?
‘Very different’ protests
Perhaps. But there are some fundamental differences that might lead events in other directions.
While venting the same general frustration felt by many Iranians at the suppression of change and reform, the earlier protests were limited grassroots events that failed to connect to the political strata.
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POST-POLL CRACKDOWN
More than 100 opposition figures arrested, including the brother of ex-reformist President Khatami.
Local and international phone and text message services interrupted
Social networking and newspaper websites blocked
BBC says “heavy electronic jamming” from inside Iran disrupts its Persian TV service
International journalists arrested and asked to leave
Iranian newspapers do not carry reports of the violence
Source: Various reports
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They were “bottom-up”, generally incoherent, and lacked a political vehicle to sustain them.
In both instances, they were sparked by incidents at Tehran University which spilled over into violence in the streets, raising memories of revolutionary upheavals that few Iranians want to see repeated.
Because those protests were openly encouraged by the administration of the former US President George W Bush, reformist Iranian politicians had to shun them for fear of being dubbed traitors.
This time it is very different.
The protests are in reaction to specific political grievances involving senior politicians well-embedded in the Iranian system.
On Monday, they led to a peaceful mass demonstration in Tehran – despite an official ban – that by all accounts ran into hundreds of thousands, far bigger than any of the earlier protests, and too big for the authorities to disperse without causing potentially more serious repercussions.
The current protests bring together grassroots sentiment and the political level in a way that the earlier protests did not.
That carries the current dissension into the heart of the Islamic power system.
Heavyweight supporters
The man at the centre of the storm, presidential challenger and runner-up Mir Hossein Mousavi, is not some lightweight outsider.
Ahmadinejad supporters have also rallied in Tehran
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He was Iran’s prime minister from 1981 until 1989, and was generally given high ratings for running the country through almost all of the eight years of war with neighbouring Iraq.
One of his closest associates and backers, Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, is an even weightier figure who has been a major pillar of the Islamic Republic since its foundation.
Twice president, from 1989 to 1997, Mr Rafsanjani is a pragmatic conservative who currently heads two of the regime’s most powerful bodies: the Expediency Council (which adjudicates disputes over legislation) and the Assembly of Experts (which appoints, and can theoretically replace, the Supreme Leader).
He also wields huge influence and economic clout behind the scenes.
But in this year’s presidential campaign, Mr Rafsanjani was bracketed together with Mr Mousavi and lambasted vitriolically by Mr Ahmadinejad in televised debates.
Mr Mousavi was also supported by another two-term former president, the reformist Mohammad Khatami, who withdrew his own candidacy in Mr Mousavi’s favour and is now also calling for the vote to be cancelled and re-run.
The same demand has been made by another of the election losers, Mohsen Rezaie, who for 16 years commanded the Revolutionary Guards, another of the regime’s main pillars.
In addition to alienating reformist and centrist circles, Mr Ahmadinejad (the first Iranian president not to be a cleric) is also not uniformly backed by hardline conservatives, including the religious establishment in Qom.
Where he is believed to enjoy huge support is among the Revolutionary Guards Corps and its auxiliary basij (volunteer) militia, where he has built up a strong following and patronage.
His support among the military is such that many Iran analysts have portrayed what has happened as a kind of military coup from within the regime.
But Mr Ahmadinejad has also won much support among the poor by pursuing a populist political and economic policy, disbursing funds in rural areas in a manner that his critics say has added to Iran’s woes by generating high inflation.
‘Burning dilemma’
The rift he has created appears to transcend the old division between hardliners and reformists within the system, bringing together some elements on both sides against his abrasive militarist-popularist line.
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 Much will clearly now depend on whether the street demonstrations escalate, whether the authorities respond violently, and what decision emerges from the Council of Guardians  |
An American-originated opinion poll published in the Washington Post has suggested that Mr Ahmadinejad’s surprisingly large margin of victory might in fact reflect the genuine will of the Iranian people.
The poll, conducted three weeks before the vote, indicated that Mr Ahmadinejad would win by a ratio of 2:1, slightly higher than the actual declared outcome.
But the near universal assumption of his rivals’ supporters – and of most Iran analysts and much international political opinion – seems to be that he could only have won so massively by an unprecedented use of electoral fraud.
Whatever the case, perception is what counts. And the perception of large numbers of Iranians that their votes were “stolen” presents the authorities – and especially the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – with a burning dilemma.
Much will clearly now depend on whether the street demonstrations escalate, whether the authorities respond violently, and what decision emerges from the Council of Guardians, the highly-conservative oversight body which has 10 days to adjudicate appeals lodged by Mr Mousavi and Mr Rezai.
Ayatollah Khamenei has urged the Council to study the claims closely.
Its decision could provide him with a way out of a dangerous situation and avert an eventuality where Mr Ahmadinejad could emerge in such a powerful position that Ayatollah Khamenei’s own standing could be undermined, with traditional balancing power centres eclipsed.
Much must be going on behind the scenes, involving key figures such as Mr Rafsanjani, from whom little has been heard since the results were announced.
If the confrontation remains unresolved, he and others may have to decide whether to throw their weight behind an effort that could tear apart and bring down the system in which they have a big stake, or trim their sails and accept a reduced status.
To avert an escalation, Ayatollah Khamenei may have to find a way either to persuade the losers and their backers and followers that the results were genuine and fair, or to pacify them by other means – perhaps by curbing Mr Ahmadinejad or diluting his policies in some way.
‘Worst outcome’ for Obama
In general, the Islamic regime in times of crisis has tended to find a way of holding together in order to stay afloat.
But if the current situation deteriorates into straightforward confrontation and repression on the ground, chaos could ensue, with unpredictable results.
The regime’s control mechanisms have barely begun to be tested. They are fearsome. But whether they would remain cohesive in a situation of prolonged civil strife and political polarisation is an unanswerable question.
All of this has produced the worst possible outcome for US President Barack Obama and others hoping to find a way towards dialogue with Tehran over nuclear and other issues.
Washington had studiously avoided expressing preferences before the vote, and has remained equally equivocal over the disputed outcome.
But clearly, it would have preferred to see a reformist victory, though aware that the Iranian president may set the political tone and influence the climate, but does not decide policy on such key issues as relations with the US, or Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
For Mr Obama to have opened dialogue with Tehran under a credibly-re-elected Mr Ahmadinejad would have been difficult enough in US domestic political terms.
But American experts on US-Iran relations believe his task will be considerably complicated in Congress and elsewhere should the election be seen as rigged and the results imposed by repression.
The outcome has also played into the hands of Benjamin Netanyahu’s hardline government in Israel.
Under pressure to come up with what it regards as concessions on the Palestinian issue, Mr Netanyahu has tried to argue that priority should go to what he sees as the true threat to the region – Iran.
If the Iranian election crisis is not somehow defused, he will clearly find it easier to argue his case that “the biggest threat to Israel, the Middle East and the entire world is the crossing of a nuclear weapon with radical Islam” and that there should be “an international coalition against the nuclear arming of Iran”, as he said in his policy speech on Sunday.
Q & A: Iran’s presidential election
June 10, 2009
Pro-reform Mehdi Karroubi and pro-principle-ist President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ready for election battle
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Voters go to the polls in Iran on 12 June to choose the country’s next president in a battle between the ruling conservative or “principle-ist” president and more moderate candidates.
In past elections, the incumbent has always won a second term, but voter behaviour in Iran is difficult to predict and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may have a tough fight on his hands.
If there is no clear winner this Friday, the election will go to a second round on 19 June.
The president is the head of government and on paper the second-most powerful man in Iran after the head of state, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but the complex Iranian power structure that mixes democracy with theocratic rule means that his powers are limited.
The Supreme Leader, for instance, controls the armed forces and key official appointments such as the head of state television and radio.
The president is responsible for implementing the constitution and the day to day running of domestic and foreign policy matters including the budget.
However, all legislation must be approved by the non-elected constitutional body, the Guardian Council, to ensure that it is compatible with the constitution and Islamic Law.
The president is elected every four years by popular vote and may serve a maximum of two consecutive or three non-consecutive terms.
The election is won with an absolute majority. If none of the candidates achieves this in the first round, a second round takes place.
Only the two candidates who received the greatest number of votes in the first round go through to the second, where the candidate who receives the largest number of votes wins.
The results are usually announced within 24 hours, but the Guardian Council has up to 10 days to confirm the validity of the vote.
The Interior Ministry is responsible for holding the elections and the vote count, but the Guardian Council is responsible for supervising the election.
Both bodies have the right to post observers at polling stations and representatives of political groups and candidates are allowed to supervise.
The constitution provides that candidates must come from the ranks of religious and political personalities; have administrative abilities; be resourceful, of good standing, trustworthy and pious; and believe in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic.
The Guardian Council vets candidates and has the power to disqualify any it believes do not meet the constitutional requirements. There is a right of appeal against disqualification, but the process is secretive and difficult to influence.
In this election, 475 individuals registered as candidates but the Guardian Council disqualified all but four.
Most were unknown individuals, accused by the press of registering for the excitement, but the Guardian Council also barred a number of middle-ranking politicians. One of these, a reformist former MP Akbar Alami, wrote an open letter to Ayatollah Khamenei to protest against his disqualification.
“You urged the nation to vote for someone who understands the pain of the country and the people… When the [Guardian Council] under your command limits the choice of people to a small circle of those affiliated to and imposed by the council, and gives the option of choosing between bad and worse, how can people vote based on their own understanding?” he asked.
1. Principle-ist candidates:
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – Iran’s president since 2005. The 53-year-old transport engineer was previously the mayor of Tehran.
He is a hard-liner both at home, where he does not favour the development or reform of political institutions and abroad, where he has maintained an anti-Western attitude and insisted on keeping uranium enrichment as a part of Tehran’s nuclear programme.
Bolstered by high oil prices, the president has spent heavily to consolidate his position among the urban disenfranchised and the rural population.
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Mohsen Rezai
- The 55-year-old former commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps is secretary of the Expediency Council, which arbitrates on differences between the Majlis (parliament) and the Guardian Council.
He is seen as a pragmatist and an ally of the powerful centrist politician Akbar Rafsanjani. Mr Rezai has campaigned against President Ahmadinejad’s management style and has called for a coalition government made up of both principle-ists and reformists.
Mr Rezai, who holds a doctorate in economics, says he would improve Iran’s economic situation by promoting privatization and work for an increase in foreign investment.
2. Pro-reform candidates:
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Mir-Hossein Mousavi
- The 68-year-old former prime minister has stayed out of politics for some years but is now standing on a “reformist and principle-ist” ticket.
He has the backing of several major reformist parties, but has not managed to attract the support of the main principle-ist groups.
He is believed to want to play the role of a political conciliator and to revive the idea of social responsibility and ethics. In foreign affairs, he seems to be offering little change on major issues.
Mehdi Karroubi – The 72-year-old cleric was an MP for 16 years, and Majlis Speaker for two terms. He is currently the leader of the National Trust Party, and stands at the centre of the political spectrum with a pro-reform agenda.
He is seen as a political survivor who seeks a soft and gradualist strategy of reforms. He is offering a more tolerant political climate at home and a toned-down foreign policy.
Reliable public opinion polls are hard to come by and most surveys in the media are biased or manipulated to support campaign objectives.
However, there is a general pattern that puts either President Ahmadinejad or Mr Mousavi in the first two places, with Mr Karroubi and Mr Rezai as the runners up.
President Ahmadinejad is well positioned as the balance of political power is in his favour. The Supreme Leader is seen to be supporting him, while all the main state institutions are controlled by his allies.
However, reformists believe a large turnout would play in their favour.
The campaign rhetoric and opinion polls suggest the economy is the major concern for most Iranians. Global recession, falling oil prices, government overspending, high inflation and high unemployment are serious worries.
The disposal of Iran’s oil money has been the subject of much debate, with Mr Karroubi pledging the distribution of an oil dividend of 70 dollars to every Iranian.
President Ahmadinejad used class consciousness successfully in the last election, translating it into a war against financial corruption and the very rich. The approach appealed to the urban poor and rural populations in 2005 and the president has tried to build on this in the current campaign.
Civil liberties, in particular women’s rights and freedom of the media, have been overshadowed by economic issues, but remain on the agenda and are considered a significant force in mobilising reformist activists and the middle class vote.
Iranians who are 18 years old and over are allowed to vote resulting in an electorate of some 46.2 million people.
Young people constitute a large part of the electorate with about 50% of voters being under 30.
All candidates need the support of non-committed and floating voters to win. Several senior officials, including the Supreme Leader have been calling on the voters to turn out in force this time.
Political groups are generally weak in Iran, but politics is becoming increasingly institutionalised with individual players losing influence.
These elections are a battle between the ruling right-wing principle-ist and the more moderate tendencies within the ruling establishment. The two groups have their own ideological divisions and a number of disparate groups support them.
Secular political parties and groups outside the establishment are barely tolerated and are not allowed to participate formally in the political process.
Television and radio are both state-run and their sympathies are with the principle-ists, but by law, they must broadcast all candidates’ campaign speeches and give them equal time. The broadcasts have proved influential in forming public opinion in the last weeks of campaigning.
The pro-reform newspapers and internet sites are highly influential and have had some impact on the campaign.
Persian-language channels broadcasting from outside Iran also play a role in shaping public opinion, although in previous elections they have encouraged people not to vote so as not to give legitimacy to the regime.
Iran has strict rules on how election campaigns should be run, for example, all campaign literature must be submitted to the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council by the printers.
But in this campaign, the candidates have complained of “distortions and insults” and “slander and lies” by opponents, prompting the Ayatollah Khamenei to tell all of them to watch what they said about each other.
More worrying was the warning from the Guardian Council that “misconduct” might cause them to cancel the voting in some polling stations.
BBC Monitoringselects and translates news from radio, television, press, news agencies and the internet from 150 countries in more than 70 languages. It is based in Caversham, UK, and has several bureaux abroad.
bbc.co.uk
Tiananmen shook Europe
June 6, 2009
Twenty years ago, the collapse of communism in Europe was proceeding smoothly. Tiananmen Square threw this into confusion, writes BBC Diplomatic Editor Brian Hanrahan.
Although it wasn’t obvious, the Kremlin had given the nod to reformers in Eastern Europe and privately reassured them there would be no Soviet intervention to support the hardliners.
Poland and Hungary had already embarked on the path that would see them transferring peacefully from communist rule.
As tanks were rolling into Tiananmen square, Poland was voting the communists out of power. Hungary continued to roll up the barbed wire of the Iron Curtain.
Gorbachev’s state visit emboldened Chinese protestors
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Just as reformers elsewhere in Eastern Europe were starting to take notice – and take heart – events in China threw everything into confusion.
For the old-guard communists, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was fast becoming the man you didn’t want to come to dinner for fear of the trouble that a visit from him might provoke.
And so it proved in China. The democracy movement was already campaigning against the government, but it was a state visit by Mr Gorbachev in May that emboldened its members to take over Tiananmen Square.
There, encamped between the portrait of Chairman Mao hanging on the walls of the Forbidden City, and the Great Hall of the People, they were a highly visible symbol of dissent right at the heart of China.
Night in the square
It couldn’t have come at a worse time for the Chinese leadership.
Beijing was full of journalists waiting for Mr Gorbachev to arrive. I was part of a BBC contingent there in strength for a visit that was expected to be of unusual historic importance – an opportunity to establish a more balanced relationship between these two communist giants after years of antagonism and tensions.
Instead our focus switched to this unprecedented display of political opposition.
I rushed down to the square to view with astonishment the crowds of young people who marched in and camped there.
Moving in formed columns – waving black banners embossed with gold calligraphy – they looked like the vanguard of an approaching army. And so they proved to be. From a few tens of thousands on that first day they grew over the weeks that followed to a million strong.
I spent the night with them in the square fully expecting the Chinese police would move in and disperse them during darkness. That was the Chinese way.
Instead we were still there at dawn when a pink sky showed tiny figures peering down at us from the top of the Great Hall of the People. The Politburo had come to see for themselves before deciding what to do.
Archive report: Students demonstrate in China, in 1989
It was the beginning of a power struggle about how to treat the protestors. The Communist Party general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, wanted to address their grievances. But the old guard leaders would not tolerate anything which challenged the authority of the communist party.
They prepared to put down the demonstrations by force. Zhao was removed from his position and placed under house arrest until he died in 2005. Only in the last few weeks has his account of events emerged. (Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang.)
There are striking parallels between what was happened in China and Eastern Europe.
The demonstrators had sympathisers inside the communist hierarchy who were willing to negotiate about their grievances.
The willingness of the army to shoot down protestors was in doubt.
There was unusual media coverage – in Europe it was a deliberate policy encouraged by Mr Gorbachev’s reforms – in China it was an accidental opening created by Mr Gorbachev’s visit.
I remember watching one banner being carried into Tiananmen Square congratulating the BBC on its coverage – evidence of how international coverage was influencing debate in China.
Political paralysis
Without their habitual control of the media, communist leaderships hesitated to take tough action for fear of the damage it would do both internationally and at home. It’s an illuminating demonstration of how important propaganda was to maintaining communism.
In both Europe and China the mood of euphoria on the streets was matched by political paralysis. But they were to play out very differently.
In China the elders of the party, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, decided to reassert traditional communist control. They replaced supporters of the protestors, indoctrinated sections of the army to ensure their loyalty, and closed down as much of the international media coverage as they could before taking action.
Then they rode out the firestorm of international protest, despite the long-lasting damage it did to China’s image and its economy.
This option wasn’t available to Eastern European leaders. They had neither the economic nor military weight to stifle reform in the same brutal fashion. And as long as Mr Gorbachev remained in control of the Soviet Union, they could expect no political support from there.
But China’s actions served to hearten those who opposed reform in Eastern Europe. It was reminder of how previous political challenges had been militarily suppressed in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
Archive report: The East German opposition was influenced by Tiananmen – and so was the party leadership
And that autumn I found civic groups in East Germany were being threatened with the “Tiananmen Option” if they continued to bring people on to the streets.
It was a chilling but ineffectual threat so long as Mr Gorbachev ruled. But his fall from power two years later demonstrated what a narrow window of opportunity there had been for Eastern Europeans to break free from Soviet domination.
What was now plainly on view were two different approaches to reform. The Gorbachev way was to cede political power and be prepared to see communist control crumble. The Chinese way made the supremacy of the Communist Party the overriding objective, and it alone would dictate the pace and scope of economic and social change.
China remains, 20 years later, an authoritarian state under the control of the Communist Party.
bbc.co.uk
The shot that changed Germany
June 6, 2009
The shot that changed Germany
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By Tristana Moore
BBC News, Berlin |
The case of Karl-Heinz Kurras has all the ingredients of a Cold War spy thriller.
It has now emerged that Mr Kurras, the former West Berlin police officer who shot the young student protester Benno Ohnesorg in 1967, was actually a spy working for East Germany’s secret police, the Stasi.
For years, Mr Kurras deceived his colleagues in the West Berlin police service and the German public.
The death of Ohnesorg on 2 June 1967 during a demonstration against a visit by the Shah of Iran sparked the student protest movement in West Germany and the turmoil of 1968.
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We are totally surprised – we never thought Kurras was a Stasi man Hugo Diederich, deputy head of the Association of Victims of Stalinism
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It was always assumed that the 26-year-old had been killed by a typical West German policeman, who in the eyes of the students epitomised the worst evils of the capitalist state and the establishment.
Shortly after his death, Gudrun Ensslin, who later became a leader of the left-wing militant group, the Red Army Faction, provocatively said: “This fascist state means to kill us all.”
The writer Guenter Grass described the killing as the “first political murder in the Federal Republic”.
The truth turned out to be more complicated.
Double identity
Germans are still coming to terms with the sensational discovery.
“The myth of the 1968 student protest movement has been deconstructed,” says Hubertus Knabe, the director of Berlin’s Stasi memorial site at Hohenschoenhausen.
“The students took the death of Benno Ohnesorg as proof of the ‘class state’, but it now appears it was the East German communist party and secret police that killed Ohnesorg.”
The revelations came to light after researchers at the German government’s agency that oversees the Stasi archives discovered 17 volumes detailing Mr Kurras’ double identity.
According to the files, Mr Kurras was an ideologically-driven Stasi agent and member of the East German communist Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).
The Stasi had managed to infiltrate West Berlin’s security apparatus and paid Mr Kurras for his services, the files revealed.
Researchers say Mr Kurras joined the Stasi in 1955 while he was working for the West Berlin police.
Under the codename “Otto Bohl”, Mr Kurras tipped off the Stasi about US and British troop movements and delivered secret information about the West Berlin police.
Mr Kurras worked under the codename “Otto Bohl” for the Stasi in Berlin
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“We are totally surprised. We never thought Kurras was a Stasi man,” says Hugo Diederich, deputy head of the Association of Victims of Stalinism.
For the state-run archive of Stasi documents, the Kurras file confirms the view that the Stasi were active in West Berlin and West Germany. But was the former police officer acting on Stasi orders?
“We have no evidence in the file that the Stasi gave Kurras the order to shoot Benno Ohnesorg,” says the director of the government’s Stasi archives, Hans Altendorf.
“The Stasi merely described the shooting as an ‘unlucky accident’ in the file and they broke off contact with Kurras after the shooting,” he adds.
Mr Kurras was charged with manslaughter, but acquitted in November 1967.
He said the shooting was an accident, claiming that he had been attacked by knife-wielding protesters.
Following an appeal by prosecutors and Ohnesorg’s family lawyer at Germany’s highest civil court, Mr Kurras was put on trial again in 1970 but he was also acquitted.
Unanswered questions
Germans have been left wondering whether history would have taken a different course if people had known that Mr Kurras was a Stasi spy back in 1967.
The discovery of the Kurras file has stirred a heated debate in Germany.
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 And what if I did work for [the Stasi]? What does it matter? It doesn’t change anything Karl-Heinz Kurras
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Last week, the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) put forward proposals in parliament calling for all MPs who held seats from 1949 to be investigated over any possible Stasi links.
But MPs from the governing Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party (SPD), as well as members of the Left Party, rejected the motion citing legal reasons.
“There are many barriers against research into Stasi activities in former West Germany,” says Mr Knabe. “Today’s political establishment doesn’t want to be confronted with the past.”
There are now growing calls for Mr Kurras, who is now 81 years old, to be stripped of his pension.
Chancellor Merkel told the magazine, Der Spiegel, that he did not deserve to receive full state benefits.
Amid a public uproar, the Berlin Senate has launched an investigation into the former police officer’s Stasi files.
German prosecutors have also confiscated one volume of Kurras’ Stasi file to try to establish whether the agency ordered Kurras to carry out the killing.
When asked about his connection with the Stasi, Mr Kurras told the German newspaper, Bild: “And what if I did work for them? What does it matter? It doesn’t change anything.”
Historians say there are still many unanswered questions.
“Only a fraction of the Stasi files have been officially registered, so the Kurras case won’t be the last,” says Mr Knabe. “Around 50,000 people worked for the Stasi in the former West Germany.”
East Germany’s secret police had a huge network of informers who spied on millions of people. It is clear that unlocking the secrets of the past will be a long and difficult process.
bbc.co.uk
Obama’s speach on Egypt analyzed
June 5, 2009
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“The key phrase here and of the whole speech is a new beginning, with mutual interest and mutual trust added for good effect. In this opening section, the president seeks the common ground – he will leave differences until afterwards.
“He quotes from the Koran (Be conscious of God and always speak the truth) before he quotes from the Bible and the Torah as a way of flattering his audience.
“But he also uses the authority of the quotation to justify being quite blunt in places. But first, this part is about creating a sense of shared experiences.
“Right at the top he refers to 9/11 and violent extremists (no mention of al-Qaeda by name – that would accord it respect) among a small but potent minority of Muslims. He wants to break this cycle of suspicion.
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“This is the final flourish. President Obama lets rip a bit with his rhetoric – Choose the right path, not just the easy path. He repeats this key phrase new beginning and echoes the references to the need for change that brought him to power: We have the power to make the world we seek, but only if we have the courage to make a new beginning…
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“The president’s own family connections to Islam stand him in good stead here as he tries to build rapport, but he is careful also to state that he is a Christian, having been subject to comments at home about his background. He does not want that debate restarted.
“He emphasises the peaceful characteristics of Islam, with a romantic allusion to Muslims in Chicago finding dignity and peace in their Muslim faith.
He then reaches into history to recall the achievements of Islamic countries in the development of learning – navigation and algebra among them – and to tie Islam and America together by bringing in revered figures from early US history – John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.
But he carefully introduces the idea that Muslims also thrive in modern America – Muslims have enriched America – an important theme of the speech.
“He lays out what he hopes will be the results of his policies – “a world where extremists no longer threaten our people” and American troops have come home, where Israelis and Palestinians are each secure in a state of their own and where nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes. (This last phrase is a reference to Iran).
And he ends by quoting from the Koran, the Talmud and The Bible.
bbc.co.uk
Loyal to who?
May 31, 2009
Israeli Arabs defiant on ‘loyalty laws’ plan
The BBC’s Heather Sharp reports from the Israeli-Arab town of Um al-Fahm, where residents are angry over two proposed laws apparently aimed at increasing their loyalty to the state of Israel.
Next year, Suleiman Fahmawi hopes to march to his parents’ old village
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“They’re welcome to jail us,” says Suleiman Fahmawi.
He is planning next year’s Nakba march, even though it could be illegal.
Every year, as Israelis celebrate their independence with flags and barbecues, he organises mourning marches to destroyed Arab villages.
In the 1948 Nakba, or “catastrophe”, 700,000 Palestinians fled or were forced from their homes as Israel claimed its independence.
A controversial bill backed by a government committee in Israel’s Knesset last week is seeking to ban marking it in Israel.
Next year’s planned march is to the village Mr Fahmawi says his parents were forced from three years before his birth.
They remained in Israel, meaning he was born into the conflicted situation of the state’s Israeli-Arab minority – Israeli citizens who identify themselves with Palestinians.
‘Fifth column’
The bill, proposed by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s far-right party Yisrael Beiteinu, is part of what many see as a drive to demand deeper loyalty from Israeli Arabs.
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 They are deleting our memory… They’re going to delete our language, our Arabic street names… We’ll become Jewish Nasreen Abu Bakr
Israeli-Arab artist |
They make up 20% of Israel’s population and face widely documented discrimination, but are feared by some Israelis as a potentially hostile “fifth column”.
Mr Lieberman’s party also wants all Israeli citizens to pledge allegiance to Israel as a Jewish state and perform some form of national service.
Member of parliament Alex Miller, who proposed what is being called the Nakba bill, says citizens who want equal rights should shoulder “equal responsibilities”, and not “go on demonstrations against the existence of the state”.
The town of Um al-Fahm, where Mr Fahmawi lives, is in some ways a symbol of the issues that irk Yisrael Beiteinu.
Clusters of new-looking red-roofed villas declare at least modest prosperity amid the battered pavements and dense jumble of concrete houses.
Many residents work in construction, commuting to Israel’s mainly Jewish towns.
But the green flags of the Islamic Movement, which controls the council, flutter on lampposts.
‘They control everything’
Last Nakba day, its deputy leader declared “the Zionist sun will set, as the sun of the Islamic state rises”.
Its head has previously accused Jews of using children’s blood to bake bread and called for Jerusalem to be the seat of a wide-reaching Muslim state, or caliphate.
In offices adorned with photos of the iconic Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem, sits Abdelhakeem Mufeed, editor of the movement’s newspaper.
Abdelhakeem Mufeed says his loyalty is “to Palestine, not Israel”
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His voice rises at the suggestion his leaders’ statements might alarm Israelis. “You care for the Israelis? Why are they afraid when they control everything? The Palestinians are the ones who are suffering!”
He believes clashes – and possibly even a third intifada or uprising – will result if the bills are pushed through.
“Our loyalty is to our nation, Palestine, not Israel. We cannot be loyal to the country that demolished our houses, the one responsible for our Nakba,” he says.
But the Islamic Movement by no means represents the feelings of all Israeli Arabs.
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ISRAELI-ARABS
About 1.2m, a fifth of Israel’s population, are Israeli-Arabs
They are citizens of Israel, but face widely documented discrimination
Outgoing PM Ehud Olmert said there is “no doubt” Israeli-Arabs have faced discrimination for “many years”
Israeli-Arabs own 3.5% of Israel’s land, get 3-5% of government spending and have higher poverty levels than Jewish Israelis*
There are 12 Israeli-Arabs in the 120-seat Knesset, 10 representing [primarly] Arab parties
*Source: Mossawa Center
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Further down the town’s steep streets, Said Abu Shakra shows me round the white-walled art gallery he founded 13 years ago.
It promotes dialogue by hosting work by Palestinian, Jewish and international artists.
“Of course, I accept Israel’s existence,” he says. “In spite of all our history… We have to look forward.”
Mr Abu Shakra understands why statements such as those of the Islamic Movement worry Israelis, but feels they are taken to represent the wider population in a way that the rhetoric of Jewish extremists is not.
Installation artist and painter Nasreen Abu Bakr, 31, has just returned from visiting a Jewish friend.
“In reality there is a state of Israel, but I inside I still have a problem with it. There is a conflict between my identity and my life in Israel,” she says.
Ms Abu Bakr says the two bills will be a “disaster” if they pass – although they face many hurdles.
“They are deleting our memory and they’re not going to stop here. They’re going to delete our language, our Arabic street names. We’ll become Jewish.”
‘It’s part of staying’
Many people in Um al-Fahm do not feel they owe Israel anything beyond the taxes they already pay.
They blame Israeli under-investment for the lack of work in the town, and say they have little option but to work for Jewish Israelis.
“Israel does not give us our rights,” says Mr Fahmawi, “we take them”.
In his comfortable house he says he battled discrimination to become a civil engineer and now works for both Jewish and Arab companies.
“It’s business,” he says. “And I want to stay in this land – living and working is part of staying.”
Analysts say the gap between Jewish and Arab Israelis is growing.
An annual Haifa University survey recently found only 53% of Israeli-Arabs recognised Israel’s right to exist, down from 81% in 2003, while 40% denied the Holocaust, up from 28% in 2006.
Israeli-Arabs cite the recent Gaza and Lebanon wars and ongoing discrimination as reasons, while some in Israel fear such findings show Israeli-Arabs becoming more radical.
Even with Israel’s right-leaning government, the two draft bills are drawing vocal opposition and may never become law.
But many fear that they are already widening the gulf.
bbc.co.uk
Q+A: Why did North Korea rush to a nuclear test?
May 26, 2009
By Jack Kim
SEOUL (Reuters) – North Korea’s nuclear test on Monday sparked international condemnation. Following are some questions and answers about why the North went ahead with the test and why it came sooner than analysts had expected.
WHY DID NORTH KOREA CHOOSE TO TEST NOW?
North Korea likely concluded that no concessions would flow from U.S. President Barack Obama, especially after his strongly worded response to Pyongyang’s rocket launch last month that regional powers say was a long-range missile test. To North Korea, this probably signaled Washington was in no mood for direct negotiations, something long sought by Pyongyang.
The North may have also felt it needed to boost its leverage by conducting a follow-up nuclear test after its only other test nearly three years ago was considered just a partial success.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, perhaps pressured by an ailing economy and questions about succession, may be trying to lure Washington into making a quick deal that would boost his standing at home.
Monday was the Memorial Day holiday in the United States, and the test follows a pattern of Pyongyang’s provocations timed for U.S. national holidays. The 2006 test of North Korea’s long-range Taepodong-2 missile came on the U.S. Independence Day holiday.
ARE THERE DOMESTIC FACTORS AT PLAY?
Kim is returning to the center stage in Pyongyang after a long absence from the public view following a suspected stroke last August. His illness has focused attention on who might take over in Asia’s only communist dynasty.
Analysts said the recent demonstrations of military strength might make it easier for Kim to introduce one of his three sons as a successor when most of the North Korean public is unaware he even has children. The recent saber rattling could also divert attention from the country’s economic malaise.
North Korea says it has been on a 150-day “battle” leading up to the October 10 anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party, and the nuclear test has been a major part of the propaganda campaign.
There is a possibility the North will follow up with an additional nuclear test before the 150-day campaign is over, although this would risk depleting its meager stockpile of fissile material.
Nuclear experts say at least as many as half a dozen nuclear tests are needed to accomplish the technology for a stable and workable nuclear device and it may take years for the North to build a weapon it could mount on a ballistic missile.
DOES NORTH KOREA WANT TO BE A NUCLEAR STATE?
It appears so. For a country with a battered economy and food shortages that make it reliant on outside aid to feed its people, a nuclear arms program is the ultimate bargaining chip to win concessions from the United States and regional powers.
The more nuclear advances it makes, the greater the payoff it expects in negotiations with countries willing to pay for the North’s eventual disarmament, if that ever happens.
reuters.com
